Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on intrinsic motivations for collective action
Authors: Estelle Midler, Unai Pascual, Adam Drucker, Ulf Narloch, Jose Luis Soto
Abstract: This paper addresses the differential impacts on decisions towards collective action of payments for ecosystem services where individual and collective rewards are conditional on a minimum collective conservation level being achieved. Interactions between the different reward types, farmers’ social preferences and communication are identified. A field game experiment is conducted with Andean farmers in Peru and framed around their decisions to conserve agrobiodiversity. Results indicate that PES can be effective in motivating collective action. Additionally, individual rewards are likely to be superior to collective ones and less sensitive to the environment in which they are implemented. Both types of rewards have a smaller impact on farmers who are already unconditionally cooperative, indicating a crowding effect of external rewards on intrinsic motivations towards cooperation. We also find that collective rewards may have a stronger positive impact in contexts where communication and deliberation about collective action is possible.
PES and crowding-out effects: A framed forest experiment in Tanzania
Authors: Øyvind Handberg, Arild Angelsen
Abstract: The paper presents findings from framed field experiments conducted in Tanzania. The experiments have field context in sample, task, commodity and setting. The participants’ payoffs depend on the number of trees harvested. Four levels of individual PES are tested in a between-group design: no (0%), low (20%), medium (60%) and full (100%) PES.
Results indicate that low PES has a weak negative effect on harvest rates (c. 15% lower harvest rates than no PES), while medium and full PES have clear negative effects on harvest rates (c. -39% and -82%). Harvest rates in the treatments are significantly different from each other. The results do not support the “crowding out of intrinsic motivation hypothesis”. If any, a “crowding in” effect is present, as no and low PES are theoretical equivalents for a selfish payoff-maximiser. Increasing payments have clear negative effects on harvest rates: pay little, get little; pay more, get more.
Motivation crowding-out potential and community resource conflicts in payments for biodiversity conservation: evidence from Chiapas, Mexico
Authors: Sébastien Costedoat, Esteve Corbera, Driss Ezzine De Blas
Abstract: Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs have emerged as contract-based conservation instruments. The introduction of these incentives can undermine collective action, eventually creating or exacerbating conflicts regarding common resources management. We investigate how household-based land management practices and internal forest governance processes have been re-crafted in two communities participating in a program of payments for biodiversity conservation in Mexico. We rely on interviews with participants in both communities, who develop conservation activities in both family-owned and collective land plots. We also rely on focus groups with non-participants to visualize the effectiveness and legitimacy of PES benefit-sharing. Our data suggests that community-based forest governance changes are associated with new forms of collective organization that further increase the dependence to external support. Changes in this regard are explained by the political and economic divisions characterizing relations between and within PES eligible and non-eligible households.
The divisive effect of a weight based waste fee on motivation and behavior.
Authors: Marit H. Heller, Arild Vatn
Abstract: To better understand under what conditions economic incentives may or may not promote environmental friendly behavior, the aim of this study has been to expand our insights concerning the interactions between institutional and individual factors, including the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The analysis is based on a case study from a Norwegian municipality Ulstein that introduced and later terminated a differentiated waste fee. The differentiation was based on the amount of residual waste each household produced. The theoretical framework included consists of two theories; self-determination theory and classical institutional economics. The results confirms the important role of moral norms and indicates that the stronger norms are integrated the less relevant it appears to be to follow other logics presented, in this case to save costs. The analysis also suggests that the key factor that predicts the choice of logic is how autonomous you feel in your choices.